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Introduction 
In 1971, the U.S. Department of Commerce published the 50
th Anniversary issue of the 
Survey of Current Business, entitled “The Economic Accounts of the United States: Retrospect 
and Prospect.”  There was much praise for the work of the Office of Business Economics, the 
producer of the Survey and the National Accounts.  However, on one issue, the measurement of 
capital consumption, several contributors thought that the official data did not measure what they 
were supposed to, and that changes were overdue.  Edward Denison summarized his objections 
by saying that “The measure of total capital consumption allowances is consistent neither among 
components nor over time.  The only possible use for the nonfarm components is for tax 
analysis; they have no relevance to the measurement of output or income.”  And, “…for nonfarm 
business, it consists of historical cost values and reflects whatever service lives and depreciation 
patterns are allowed at a particular time by tax laws and regulations and by accountants” (p. 40).    
In 1975, the BEA announced that the upcoming benchmark revision of the national 
accounts would involve abandoning the dependence on tax return depreciation because it “…is 
not the proper measure for inclusion in national income and product accounts…” (p. 14).  
I suggest in this paper that the same state has now been reached for measures of the 
location of production, especially production by multinational firms, and the corresponding  
   2
measures of international trade, especially in industries in which intangible and financial capital 
are major inputs into production.  The same problems of ascertaining the location of production 
exist in domestic measure of regional or state gross product, because much of trade across 
regions or states is intrafirm trade, the share of production from intangible or financial assets 
differs among locations, and there are incentives to distort values for tax minimization purposes.  
The problem extends beyond intrafirm trade, but it is more acute in intrafirm trade because many 
product valuations escape market tests.  In this paper I concentrate attention on distortions in 
international transactions because there is more information available for them. 
  As production comes to depend more and more on intangible assets, such as patents, 
copyrights, technological and scientific knowledge, techniques of management or of production 
and distribution, product and company logos, and company names, the location of production by 
multinational firms becomes more and more ambiguous.  The reason is that in a multinational 
firm, these assets have no clear geographical location, but only a nominal location determined by 
the parent company’s tax or legal strategies.  The geographical assignment by the firm then 
determines where production based on these assets is reported to take place, the distribution of 
production across countries, which sales are exports or imports, and the direction of trade. 
  If these assignments of intangible assets were made randomly, the only consequence for 
the measurement of production and trade would be some loss of accuracy of individual 
observations.  There is strong evidence, however, that these assignments are not random, but are 
made in order to minimize taxes, and that they operate to reduce the measured output of 
countries with high tax rates on business income and exaggerate the output of low-tax countries.  
They also tend to exaggerate the imports of high-tax countries and understate their exports.  The 
problem in trade data is probably worse for trade in services than for trade in goods.  The   3
measurement of trade in goods is anchored more in observable physical crossings of borders, 
where values must be declared, but it exists also in trade in goods, especially those goods for 
which much of the value is contributed by intangible assets.  The area of ambiguity is also 
increased by the growth in intrafirm trade, especially trade in parts and components, for which 
arm’s length transactions, and the corresponding prices, may not exist. 
  One purpose of the paper is to summarize the evidence for systematic distortions of the 
values of production and trade and to relate them to their causes.  A second purpose is to make 
some estimates of the extent of the distortions.  A third purpose is to suggest possible ways of 
estimating economic valuations of these quantities by reducing the dependence of these estimates 
on corporate bookkeeping. 
The Sources of Measurement Problems 
  There are two main sources of problems in measuring the location of production and the 
direction of trade.  One is the increasing share of intangible and financial inputs into production 
and the second is the increasing importance of transactions that take place across national 
borders within multinational firms.  For regional accounts, the latter problem arises from 
transactions within firms across regions.  Each of them by itself would give rise to measurement 
problems, but the combination of the two magnifies the effects of each one. 
  The most fundamental source of the problems is the fact that more and more production 
and trade are based on inputs from intangible assets, and to a lesser extent, financial assets, the 
location of which is difficult or impossible to define.  The OECD (2006, p. 34), describes this 
development, with respect to intangible assets, as “One of the most important commercial 
developments in recent decades,” and the report points particularly to the fact that “it is common 
for intangible property to be used simultaneously by more than one part of an enterprise.”  Thus,   4
many intangible assets have no clear geographical location.  Their only definite location is a 
legal one, their ownership.  The firm that owns such assets, if it is a multinational firm, can move 
them from one member of the multinational group to another, changing the nominal geographical 
location without changing the geographical location of the use of the asset or changing the 
control of the asset.  The effect of such a transaction is to shift the apparent location of the 
production based on that asset.  In the process, the firm may change what had been recorded as 
production by a location into imports into that location.  The OECD urged “…principled rules so 
as to rule out the possibility of the enterprise’s simply nominating one part of the enterprise as 
the owner (by booking the intangible assets there) irrespective of whether, for example, that part 
had the experience and/or capacity to assume and manage the risks associated with the intangible 
property” (p. 35). 
  What intangible assets are involved?  Software is one asset that has been the subject of 
some literature on international shifting for tax purposes, but there are many others.  One news 
article referred to “…patents on drugs, ownership of corporate logos, techniques for 
manufacturing processes and other intellectual assets…”  A tax lawyer was quoted as calling 
such moves routine, “…international tax planning 101...”, adding that “…most of the assets that 
are going to be reallocated as part of a global repositioning are intellectual property…that is 
where most of the profit is.” (“Key Company Assets Moving Offshore,” New York Times, Nov. 
22, 2002).   
  Many of the same problems arise with the location of production based on the financial 
assets of a multinational firm, although the valuations of the assets are more easily defined.  A 
transfer of assets from a parent to a wholly-owned or majority-owned affiliate, or a transfer 
among affiliates, can be valued more reliably than a transfer of intangible assets, but it may   5
involve no change in the degree of the parent’s control of the asset.  Production appears to have 
shifted its location from one location to another, but all the other inputs into production have 
remained in the former locations.  This issue has increased in importance in the case of the 
United States as the share of U.S. outward FDI in holding companies has risen. 
  These measurement problems are not new, but they seem to be growing in importance as 
more firms and their financial advisors become aware of the potential for reducing taxes by using 
transactions with foreign affiliates.  One possible indication of a growing use of this type of “tax 
planning” is the rising affiliate share of the net income of U.S. multinationals.  The share of 
nonbank affiliates in the net income of nonbank U.S. multinationals, which had been around a 
quarter in the early 1980s, reached more than a third in the 1990s and close to half in 2003-2005 
(BEA web site, April 9, 2008).  That doubling of the affiliate share of net income was much 
larger than the increase in the affiliates’ share of employment or expenditures on fixed assets of 
these multinationals.  
The Distortion of Production and Trade Measures 
  The main interest in the mismeasurement or distortion of the location of production has 
been on the part of tax authorities worried about the loss of tax revenue through such practices as 
the shifting of profits to low-tax locations.  Much of the evidence on the manipulation of 
corporate data stems from the effort to curb tax avoidance. The main purpose of the OECD 
report cited above was the creation of a basis for the taxation of multinationals that countries 
could agree on. However, the issues raised are important for the measurement of trade and output 
in the national accounts. 
 One sign of distorted measures of output and its location is the reporting of output and 
profits in locations where there is little or no input of labor or tangible capital.  Another is the   6
reporting of ratios of output and profits to tangible inputs that differ to an extreme extent from 
worldwide norms.  The inputs for which location is most reliably measured and least likely to be 
manipulated are of labor (“people functions” in OECD terminology) and of physical capital in 
the form of plant and equipment. 
  Since much of the distortion comes about in connection with trade and other transactions 
and allocations of income within multinational firms, and the United States collects and 
publishes the most detailed data on transactions within multinational firms, we can use those data 
to try to measure the distortions.  These intrafirm transactions are a likely place to search for 
distortions because in many cases it is impossible to find comparable arm’s length transactions 
by which the tax authorities can judge correct values.  Much of the intrafirm trade in goods 
involves unfinished goods at various stages of production, not easily compared across firms.  The 
goods may differ not only in the degree of finishing, but also in the degree to which they 
incorporate the firm’s intangible assets and skills or the peculiarities of the firm’s production 
processes. 
  One source of information on the distortion of output locations by U.S. multinationals is 
their reports on operations in tax havens, especially small tax havens with little local 
consumption, labor force, or physical capital.  They may not be the main locations for distortions 
of output measures, but they have so little real productive activity that the distorted activity 
measures stand out. 
  Hines (2005) reported that “Much of reported tax haven income consists of financial 
flows from other foreign affiliates that parents own indirectly through their tax haven affiliates.  
Clearly, American firms locate considerable financial assets in foreign tax havens and their 
reported profitability in tax havens greatly exceeds any measure of their physical presence there”   7
(p. 78).   Hines goes on to suggest that firms in other countries that largely exempt their firms’ 
foreign income from taxation, such as Germany and the Netherlands, have even stronger 
incentives to locate investment and income production in tax havens (p. 79). 
Other developments in the tax planning strategies of U.S. multinational firms, described 
by Mutti and Grubert (2006), focus on intangible assets, adding to the possibilities for the parent 
company to “…increase its earnings abroad from exploiting intangible assets that it develops in 
the United States…” and “…accomplish the relocation or migration of intangible assets abroad” 
(p. 2).  This is a “relocation” that is obviously a fiction, since the geographical location of a 
company’s intangible assets is indefinable.  They can be used in many locations simultaneously.  
  Some hints about one way in which U.S. multinationals locate their measured production 
and profits in tax havens is given by Table 1. It shows the ratios of U.S. affiliates’ total assets to 
their employment, employee compensation, and plant and equipment in the world as a whole 
outside the United States and in several low tax countries.  Affiliates in the area called “Other 
Western Hemisphere,” essentially islands in the Caribbean, own enormous assets relative to their 
labor input, measured by employment or employee compensation, and their physical capital 
input, measured by their stock of property, plant, and equipment.  For example, while the 
average ratio of assets to employment around the world in 2005 was about $1 million per 
employee, the ratios in the three European countries shown separately were all over $4 million 
per employee and those for affiliates in “Other Western Hemisphere” were $16 million per 
employee.  Within this group, affiliates in Bermuda had assets of almost $150 million per 
employee and those in U.K. Islands in the Caribbean, $29 million per employee.  While 
worldwide, U.S. affiliates owned assets 27 times their payrolls, those in “Other Western 
Hemisphere” had assets almost 600 times their payrolls.  These ratios could differ across    8
Table 1: Ratios of Total Assets to Employment & Compensation of Employees: US MOFAs, 2005 











        
All countries  12  27  1,035 
        
Canada 5  16  633 
        
Europe 17  28  1,513 
Ireland 29  82  4,283 
Netherlands 38  73  4,469 
Switzerland 49  56  4,675 
        
Latin America and Other Western 
Hemisphere 12  45  709 
        
Central & South America  4  13  208 
      
Other Western Hemisphere  57  593  16,167 
Barbados 81  739  22,168 
Bermuda 100  1,863  145,830 
UK Islands, Caribbean1 123  686  29,395 
Western Hemisphere, n.e.c.2 16  203  6,022 
      
Middle East  5  15  697 
      
Asia Pacific  9  22  643 
Hong Kong  31  42  1,531 
Singapore 14  37  1,292 
 
1. British Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat. 
2. Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Cuba, Dominica, French Islands (Caribbean), 
Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom Islands (Atlantic). 
 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis web site, downloaded in Nov., 
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countries because the industry composition of U.S. affiliates is different.  However, industry 
composition does not explain all of these differences.  Ratios for Depository Institutions and for 
Finance (except depository institutions) and Insurance showed similar wide differences between 
the tax havens and other countries. 
  The wide differences among affiliates in different regions with respect to ratios of assets 
to labor input do not represent differences in physical capital intensity.  The areas with high 
ratios of total assets to labor input were also areas with high ratios of total assets to Property, 
Plant, and Equipment.  The high capital intensity of these affiliates reflected holdings of financial 
or intangible assets, rather than plant and equipment. 
Table 2 displays the “profit-type return” relative to labor compensation for nonbank, 
majority-owned affiliates in 2005. Profit-type return is defined by the BEA as measuring 
“…profits before income taxes…” excluding “…nonoperating items (such as special charges and 
capital gains and losses) and income from equity investments” (U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2004, p. M-19).  That definition leads to an understatement of the degree of distortion 
by excluding income from equity investments, one of the mechanisms for transferring income. 
  These ratios are clearly related to the asset ratios of Table 1.  While the worldwide ratios 
of “profit-type return” to payrolls was 84 percent, the ratio in Switzerland was 160 percent and in 
Ireland, over 660 percent.  Those profitability numbers, large as they are, pale beside those of 
“Other Western Hemisphere,” averaging over 1000 percent, including over 3000 percent in 
Barbados and Bermuda.  These extremely high ratios of profits to labor income, despite the 
omission of income from equity investments, were achieved by attributing large amounts of 
financial or intangible capital to affiliates in those countries that employed very few workers and 
had little payroll expense.   10
Table 2: Ratio of Profit-type Return to Compensation of Employees 
by Majority-owned Nonbank Affiliates of US Nonbank Parents, (2005) 
  
Ratio of Profit-type Return to 
Compensation of Employees 
    
All countries  0.840 
    
Canada 0.848 





    
Latin America and Other Western 
Hemisphere 1.555 
  
Central & South America  0.978 
  
Other Western Hemisphere  11.709 
Barbados 34.967 
Bermuda 36.062 









Asia Pacific  1.178 
Hong Kong  0.953 
Singapore 2.978 
 
1.  British Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat. 
2.  Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Cuba, Dominica, French Islands (Caribbean), 
     Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
     Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom Islands (Atlantic). 
3.  Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria and Yemen. 
 
Source: 
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis web site, downloaded in Nov., 2007.   11
The Direction of Trade 
  The conventions that determine the apparent location of production also determine the 
reported direction of trade.  Meade (1951, p. 34) defined exports as an element of “…demands 
for goods and services which directly or indirectly cause a demand for factors of production (i.e. 
for the productive services of land, capital, enterprise and work)…” whose incomes are recorded 
in the national income.  Imports, correspondingly, lead to a demand for “…the productive 
resources of other countries.”  That definition invites the question of how to treat output from an 
intangible asset developed in Country A by Firm X, but allocated to a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Firm X in Country B.  If the output is then exported, should it be considered an export of 
Country A or of Country B?  A similar question arises if a service is sold by a wholly-owned 
affiliate of Firm X incorporated in Country B to a buyer in Country C, but the service is 
performed entirely by employees of parent Firm X in Country A.  Should it be treated as an 
export of Country A or of Country B? 
In the case of one service imported into the United States, insurance services, data on 
U.S. imports from all sources, both U.S. affiliates and others, reveal the ambiguities in the 
reported location of the production of these services and the meaning of the reported trade (Table 
3).  U.S. imports of insurance services increased substantially after 2001, and the tiny islands of 
the Caribbean were responsible for almost half the imports, and sometimes more.  
An obvious question about the $13 billion of imports of insurance services is whether 
they were produced by resources in these islands.  Some doubts might be provoked by the fact 
that while the United States reported almost $12 billion in payments to Bermuda for insurance 
services in 2004 and over $10 billion in 2005, Bermuda reported total exports of insurance 
services of only $20 million in that year (Bermuda, Department of Statistics web site).  The    12
Table 3: Comparison of US Payments and Receipts of Source Countries for Insurance






















Receipts From All 
Countries
2,3 
2001 7,167  1,867  16,706  n.a.  123 
2002 7,499  1,884  22,150  n.a.  145 
2003 10,034  2,025  25,234  n.a.  142 
2004 11,785  4,457  29,038  20  203 
2005 10,220  2,789  28,482  20  195 
 
Note: 
1. "Other, Western Hemisphere" refers to Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Cuba, Dominica, 
    French Islands (Caribbean), Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,  
    St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom Islands (Atlantic). 
2. Data are not available for Cuba, French Islands (Caribbean), Haiti, and United Kingdom Islands (Atlantic). 
3. 2005 data for Trinidad and Tobago are not available. 2004 data are used instead. 
 
Source:  
Borga and Mann (2004); 
Nephew, Koncz, Borga and Mann (2005); 
Koncz, Mann and Nephew (2006); 
IMF BOP CD (2007). 
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United States reported importing almost $3 billion in insurance services from “Other Western 
Hemisphere” in 2005, when these countries reported total worldwide insurance service exports 
of less than $200 million to all destinations.   The question raised by these comparisons is 
whether these service imports reported by the United States were, in fact, produced by labor and 
physical capital located in the United States, and possibly other developed countries, and 
financial assets controlled by parent firms in the United States, but attributed to affiliates in the 
Caribbean?  Were the $17 billion of reported imports into the United States, in fact, U.S. output 
that never left the borders of the country?  If that were the case, U.S. output was understated and 
U.S. imports were overstated by this amount in this one service industry. 
The shifting of income by paper transactions in order to save on corporate income taxes 
is not a phenomenon limited to U.S. multinationals.  The European Commission has been 
discussing proposals for a uniform method of allocating income among the countries in which a 
multinational operates, an idea that has generated strong opposition from several members of the 
Union.  A recent working paper (Fuest, Hemmelgarn, and Ramb, 2006), based on the Deutsche 
Bundesbank’s database on German multinationals’ foreign operations and a matched data  base 
on the firms’ domestic operations, calculated what firms’ distributions of taxable income across 
countries would be under a hypothetical allocation of income based on sales, employment, and 
assets, including tangible and intangible assets.  The paper showed large discrepancies between 
the allocated income distribution and the reported one, although the method of allocation did not 
remove all possibilities of profit shifting to reduce income tax.   
The Size of the Distortions 
For the United States, the examples of apparent distortions of measurements of output 
and trade cited above are confined to a few very small countries, because the smallness of the tax   14
havens makes the anomalies between inputs and outputs conspicuous.  We very roughly estimate 
the “true” output and sales from U.S. affiliates in certain tax havens by fitting functions relating 
measured output or sales to inputs of labor and physical capital across countries that are not, to a 
major extent, tax havens, or at least contain substantial resources of labor and capital, and 
applying these functions to the tax havens.  The differences between these estimated “true” 
outputs and sales and the reported ones are our estimates of the distortions in the income and 
trade accounts of these countries from the reporting by U.S. affiliates. 
For 2004, we have estimated the exaggeration of the value added, or output, and of sales 
of U.S. affiliates in eight tax havens (Ireland, Switzerland, Barbados, Bermuda, United Kingdom 
Islands in the Caribbean, Western Hemisphere, n.e.c., Hong Kong, and Singapore).  The 
exaggeration of value added, estimated from its relation to labor compensation, was $33 billion, 
about 4 percent of the worldwide total of affiliate sales.  The estimated exaggeration in the sales 
of these affiliates was almost $360 billion, over 10 percent of worldwide sales.  Since these are 
relatively small markets, most of the reported sales must have been exports, suggesting a larger 
impact on exports and imports and balances of payments. 
The paper based on German multinationals’ data, discussed above, estimated the country 
distribution of their corporate income in the countries of the European Union under “formula 
apportionment” and compared it with that under separate accounting, the current system.   
Germany, a high-tax country, would have gained 6 percent in its corporate tax base from 1996 to 
2001.  Ireland, among low-tax countries, would have lost 40 percent, Belgium would have lost 
27 percent, Luxembourg, 18 percent, and the Netherlands, 65 percent (ibid., p.17).  Thus, a shift 
to formula apportionment, even an apportionment that leaves room for some forms of income   15
shifting, as mentioned above, would have had large effects on the location of corporate income 
in Europe, and corresponding effects on the location of production and trade. 
One of the devices used to transfer income without changing the location of labor, 
physical capital, or intangible assets is to route the ownership of foreign affiliates through other 
affiliates located in low-tax countries. For majority-owned U.S. affiliates in 1999, 13 percent of 
assets were in the form of equity investments in other foreign affiliates.  By 2005, the share of 
such assets had increased to 23 percent.  In “Other Western Hemisphere,” 33 percent of assets 
were in that form, in Luxembourg, 72 percent, in the Netherlands, 48 percent, and in 
Switzerland, 35 percent.  This is, aside from Switzerland, a different set of countries from the tax 
havens described above, to which income produced in the United States may have been shifted, 
and for some of these countries, a claim might be made that the management of investments had 
been transferred as well.  That possibility might be tested by seeing whether there was a 
corresponding movement of labor or labor income to accompany the transfer of assets. 
Some of these problems, in the case of the United States, are dealt with in the BEA’s 
ownership-based accounts (Landefeld, Whichard, and Loewe, 1993) in the sense that they ignore 
geographical shifts within a single enterprise.  However, these are intended as supplements to the 
standard accounts, not as replacements of them, and the differences from the standard accounts 
represent conceptual differences, not corrections of distortions.  The ownership accounts omit 
genuine geographical shifts of resources within the same firm, an important element of national 
accounts, because they focus on ownership, rather than location.  
Is There a Solution? 
The existence of these measurement problems is more obvious than the solution.  We 
could move toward a more logical estimate of the location of multinational firms’ production by   16
discarding the accounting measures supplied by the firms, because they are too badly twisted by 
tax avoidance maneuvers, and substituting constructed measures.  The location of production 
could be  approximated by assuming that it is proportional to inputs of labor and capital, 
including physical capital, human capital, perhaps represented by labor compensation, and 
knowledge capital, for which patents and copyrights, or payments for them, could be a proxy.  
For elements of capital with no definite geographical location, such as many forms of intellectual 
or other intangible capital, an assignment to the parent firm, or the main location of management 
activity would be preferable to the current practice of accepting the firm’s tax-determined 
allocation.  The same would be true for equity in units of the same multinational firm.  One result 
would be not only a different allocation of production, but a different picture of the flow of trade, 
since a reallocation of production implies a reallocation of trade. 
The problems involved in estimating the location of production and the corresponding 
flows of exports and imports are not new to the BEA or other statistical authorities.  Similar 
issues arise in estimating sub-national output measures.  For example, in estimating gross state 
product, the BEA must make some geographical allocation of data for central administrative 
offices of multiestablishment firms.  The process is not described very fully, but seems to 
involve a “reassignment” of nonwage value added in mining, manufacturing, and construction 
from the states of operating establishments to the states in which the central administrative 
offices are located (Friedenberg and Beemiller, 1997).  Since the nonwage value added is not 
reported by the central administrative offices, the method assumes that the earnings from the 
corporation’s intangible assets, reported by the individual establishments, should be attributed to 
the headquarters location of the corporation.  As in the international case, the reported earnings   17
may be subject to some manipulation for tax reasons of valuations in transactions among the 
corporation’s establishments in different states.    
Concluding Comments 
  The growth in importance of intangible productive assets, combined with tax-induced 
allocations of intangible assets within multinational firms, are increasingly distorting measures of 
the location of production, particularly the distribution among countries.   Some very crude 
measures of the size of the distortions are offered here, only for a group of mainly small tax 
havens, because the effects of tax planning are most visible in small host countries.  Even for 
these countries, the estimated distortion is as large as 10 percent of worldwide sales of U.S.-
owned affiliates. 
While a suggestion is made here for an alternative measure of the location of productive 
inputs, particularly intangible inputs, the problem runs deeper than that solution.  The important 
role of intangible productive assets, which have no clearly definable location and can be used in 
many places simultaneously, within the firm, makes any measure of the location of production 
ambiguous.  The ownership of production is more readily definable than the geographical 
location of production.  Perhaps the geographical location of production has little meaning for 
multinational firms.  18
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